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Abstract
The social sciences are predominantly seen by their practitioners as critical endeavours,
which should inform criticism of harmful institutions, beliefs and practices. Accordingly,
political attacks on the social sciences are often interpreted as revealing an unwillingness
to accept criticism and an acquiescence with the status quo. But this dominant view of
the political implications of social scientific knowledge misses the fact that people can
also be outraged by what they see as its apologetic potential, namely that it provides
excuses or justifications for people doing bad things, preventing them from being
rightfully blamed and punished. This introduction to the special issue sketches the long
history of debates about the exculpatory and justificatory consequences of social science
and lays the foundations for a theory of social scientific apologia by examining three main
aspects: what social and cognitive processes motivate this type of accusation, how social
theorists respond to it and whether different contexts of circulation of ideas affect how
these controversies unfold.
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Most scholars like to think that when people oppose a social scientific idea, they do so for
‘epistemic’ reasons: they believe that a certain bit of knowledge does not correspond to
reality, or is meaningless, or has methodological flaws, and so they criticise it. Many
disagreements both within and outside academia are presumably based on such reasons.
But there are many other, ‘non-epistemic’, reasons why people might oppose social
scientific ideas. They might do so because they believe that the idea has been conceived
in a way that is unethical, for example, an experiment in which subjects are harmed or a
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plagiarised study. Or because they believe it to be useless and that it is bad to waste
financial and intellectual resources on it. They might do so because they believe that it
provides confidential information to malevolent actors. Or because it portrays certain
things they cherish in a defamatory way, and they believe that this is both inherently bad
and effectively harmful.
While this list is incomplete, it probably captures a great deal of the forms of non-
epistemic oppositions against social scientific ideas: that they are unethical, fraudulent,
useless, intrusive and defamatory. This introduction, along with the papers of the special
issue, deals with an additional and often neglected type of opposition, one that I call
‘apologetic’, namely that social scientific explanations provide excuses or justifications
for people doing bad things, preventing them from being rightfully blamed and punished.
When social science focuses its gaze on bad stuff, such as racism, dictatorship, terrorism,
rape, poverty or addiction, so the argument goes, it risks stripping individuals engaged in
these acts of their agency and making them not responsible for what they do, thus giving
them an excuse (and by ‘excuse’, it is meant a bad one). Or, alternatively, explanations
and theories end up portraying such conditions as normal, as fulfilling some purposes or
functions in the grand scheme of social things, thus giving perpetrators a (bad) justifi-
cation and harming victims.
Many debates about the alleged exculpatory and justificatory effects of social
research follow a similar script. They often occur after disruptive events such as wars,
terrorist attacks, political scandals, economic crises, coups, crime spikes and riots. They
are initiated either by social scientists themselves or by people occupying prominent
positions, such as state officials and pundits. Notable recent examples include former
Prime Minister of France Manuel Valls stating shortly after the November 2015 Paris
attacks that ‘no social, sociological, nor cultural excuse’ had to be sought for what had
happened, and former London Mayor Boris Johnson declaring during the 2011 London
riots that ‘it is time that people who are engaged in looting and violence stopped hearing
economic and sociological justifications for what they are doing’. When accusations are
voiced by prominent figures and start capturing public attention, reactions from repre-
sentative spokespeople of the social scientific associations usually follow. In 2011, the
British Sociological Association countered Johnson’s statements by arguing that ‘sociol-
ogists seek to explain – not explain away – these events’ (Brewer & Wollman, 2011). In
France, leaders of the main national sociological associations denied any exculpatory
effect and argued that the way sociologists explain terrorism is fundamentally similar to
how earth scientists explain earthquakes or how oncologists explain cancer (Lebaron
et al., 2015).
Many scholars probably agree with these responses and believe that the argument that
explanations amount to excuses or justifications is fundamentally flawed on various
grounds. But while these reactions might be entirely justified to counter grotesque
misrepresentations of social science and protect the financial and symbolic interests of
researchers, it is clear that they do not sufficiently clarify all the issues at hand, especially
given that critics are often social scientists themselves who develop sophisticated ver-
sions of the argument. What we need, therefore, are rigorous, theoretically informed and
empirically grounded analyses of controversies about the alleged apologetic potential of
social research. The present introduction is a first step in this direction. It is structured in
320 European Journal of Social Theory 24(3)
three sections: the first is a historical sketch aimed at showing that accusations against
the apologetic nature of social science have a long and complex history. The second
reviews recent debates in which such arguments have played an important role. The third
examines three themes that are addressed more extensively by the contributions to the
special issue: how we should interpret these accusations, what kind of arguments social
scientists devise to counter them and the role they play in extra-academic contexts.
A history still to be written
It is striking how pervasive the problem of social scientific apologia has been in the long
history of social thought and how overlooked it is today. Many early social scientists
believed it to be a central epistemological problem that needed a specific solution. Their
proposed solutions and the arguments exchanged with their critics provide insight to
understand the origin and evolution of several assumptions that still pervade social
scientific research today.
Of course, the idea that free will is an illusion and that everything that happens in the
world is determined by necessary laws of nature (rather than divine providence) has
frequently sparked moral outrage on the grounds that it exonerated wrongdoers. If
everything is determined, how can we judge what people do and separate the good from
the bad? The whole modern period is replete with debates of this kind, in which philo-
sophers were criticised, when not censored or punished, for defending some form of
determinism. In his Philosophical Dictionary, Voltaire thus summarised these quarrels:
If one looks closely at it, one sees that the doctrine contrary to that of destiny is absurd; but
there are many people destined to reason badly, others not to reason at all, others to
persecute those who reason. Some say to you: “Do not believe in fatalism; for then every-
thing appearing inevitable, you will work at nothing, you will wallow in indifference, you
will love neither riches, nor honours, nor glory; you will not want to acquire anything,
you will believe yourself without merit as without power; no talent will be cultivated,
everything will perish through apathy.” Be not afraid, gentlemen, we shall ever have
passions and prejudices, since it is our destiny to be subjected to prejudices and passions:
we shall know that it no more depends on us to have much merit and great talent, than to
have a good head of hair and beautiful hands: we shall be convinced that we must not be
vain about anything, and yet we shall always have vanity. I necessarily have the passion for
writing this, and you have the passion for condemning me; both of us are equally fools,
equally the toys of destiny. Your nature is to do harm, mine is to love truth, and to make it
public in spite of you. (Voltaire, 1764/1924, pp. 100–101)
Before Voltaire, John Bramhall had reprimanded Thomas Hobbes, claiming that his
deterministic conception ‘dishonours the nature of man’ and makes ‘men to be but the
tennis-balls of destiny’ and warning that his views were ‘pernicious both to Piety and
Policy, and destructive to all relations of mankind, between Prince and Subject, Father
and Child, Master and Servant, Husband and Wife’ (as cited in Jackson, 2007, pp. 198,
294). Readers of Baruch Spinoza were concerned that if it were true that there is a ‘fatal
necessity of all things and actions’, then ‘the sinews of all laws, of all virtue and religion,
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are cut, and all rewards and punishments are useless’, to which Spinoza famously replied
that ‘men can be excusable, and nevertheless lack blessedness and suffer in many ways.
A horse is excusable for being a horse and not a man; but he must still be a horse and not
a man. Someone who is crazy because of a dog’s bite is indeed to be excused; never-
theless, he is rightly suffocated’ (as cited in Nadler, 2018, p. 386). David Hume, who
scoffed ‘the vulgar’ for not understanding that ‘almost in every part of nature, there is
contained a vast variety of springs and principles, which are hid, by reason of their
minuteness or remoteness’, devoted a long section of his Treatise to discuss whether
his ‘doctrine of necessity’ had ‘dangerous consequences to religion and morality’ (as
cited in Millican, 2009, pp. 651, 696).
But the emergence of the social sciences in the 19th century made deterministic
claims more powerful and pervasive, thus provoking even stronger reactions. Many of
the modern philosophers who defended determinism actually did not believe that the
highest spheres of human experience and creativity, whether they were called moral,
spiritual or cultural, were subject to laws of nature (Hacking, 1990, p. 154). The 19th
century expansion of systematic inquiries and collection of facts about social life made
possible not only to think about social laws and determinism in all human affairs,
including in areas that had traditionally been spared from this perspective (such as love,
art and religion), but also to acquire great precision in determining the regularity of
social laws. Although the prediction of social events never acquired the terrifying pre-
cision that can be found in dystopian fictions, such as the Precrime system in Philip
Dick’s short story ‘The Minority Report’, the statistical regularities of events such as
marriages and suicides that were observed and popularised in the early 19th century
looked disturbingly orderly.
The Belgian astronomer Adolphe Quetelet, who aimed to build a ‘social physics’
from these statistical data, was one of the first theorists whose explanations of crime
were interpreted as excuses for criminals. His theory that he himself summarised in
private correspondence as the view that ‘it is society that prepares the crime; the guilty
person is only the instrument who executes it’ was seen by many as leading to fatalism
(as cited in Lottin, 1912, p. 479). Quetelet’s favourite arguments to fend off accusations
of fatalism were that social determinism does not imply individual determinism and that
the social system can be transformed, although slowly and only by ‘men gifted with a
superior power of genius’ (p. 408). Quetelet’s theory of social laws travelled across
countries and disciplines, prompting extensions of determinism to novel areas of society.
The historian Henry Thomas Buckle drew on Quetelet in his influential History of
Civilization in England, in which the laws of history and society were portrayed as
irresistible and always prevailing over government interventions, according to a script
later recited by William Graham Sumner (1906) in his characterisation of ‘folkways’ as
superior to ‘stateways’.
Although Karl Marx approvingly mentioned Quetelet in some of his writings (includ-
ing an 1853 New York Tribune article arguing against capital punishment), he frequently
accused his intellectual opponents of excusing the inexcusable instead of finding himself
at the receiving end of such attacks. The dismissal of economic, historical or sociological
accounts as ‘apologia’ for capital is frequent in Marx’s writings: in the Theories of
Surplus Value, for example, Thomas Malthus is described as a ‘professional sycophant
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of the landed aristocracy, whose rents, sinecures, squandering, heartlessness etc. he
justified economically’ and is charged with a ‘sin against science’ because he made
an ‘apology for the exploiters of labour’ (Marx, 1905/1968, pp. 115, 117, 120). (For his
part, Friedrich Engels [1845/1892, p. 285] added that Malthus’s theory had become ‘the
pet theory of all genuine English bourgeois, and very naturally, since it is the most
specious excuse for them’). But progressive theorists were not spared from such charges.
In the preface to the second edition of The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Napoleon, Marx
lambasted Pierre-Joseph Proudhon’s book on the same subject: by representing Louis
Napoleon’s 1851 coup d’état ‘as the result of an antecedent historical development’,
Proudhon’s account had inadvertently become ‘a historical apologia for its hero’ (Marx,
1869/1934, p. 6).
Crime, however, remains the most frequent aspect of social life whose explanation is
seen as undermining the moral fabric of society. The members of the so-called Italian
school of criminal anthropology, usually portrayed (not without reasons) as dreadfully
punitive in their recommendations, actually faced these objections on a regular basis.
Cesare Lombroso, for example, argued that Italian statutory rape laws should be adjusted
to local sexual habits and sentencing practices. In the preface to the third edition of his
magnum opus, he complained that he was the common target of a ‘legend’ according to
which his studies aimed ‘to undermine criminal law, giving liberty to all rascals and
undermining the principle of free will’ (Lombroso, 1884/2006, p. 165). His response,
which is reminiscent of Spinoza’s, was that precisely because criminals were not really
in control of their actions (especially those who were ‘born criminals’), it was perfectly
appropriate for public authorities to prevent them from doing harm, including by execut-
ing them.
Similar debates took place over functional explanations of crime, such as those
advanced by Émile Durkheim in the Rules of Sociological Method, according to which
the presence of crime in human societies is both inevitable (because individual differ-
ences cannot but produce some strains, however trivial) and useful (because by provok-
ing a collective reaction crime boosts social solidarity). Sociologist and magistrate
Gabriel Tarde (1895, p. 149) reacted to Durkheim’s claim that ‘crime is normal’ and
that it is a ‘factor of public health’ by writing that it was the scientific expression of the
‘disastrous development of the most extreme indulgence practiced by judges and jurors
alike’. Similar views were shared by many other influential social scientists of the time:
both Vilfredo Pareto and Gustave Le Bon, for example, lamented the rise of ‘humani-
tarianism’, which for them included the belief that society is responsible for all individ-
ual faults and flaws. Pareto explicitly criticised the court testimonies of medical and
psychiatric expert witnesses who, according to him, ‘make a business of accusing
“Society” of not having been as considerate as it might have been of the poor criminal’
(Pareto, 1916/1935, p. 1173). Le Bon, for which philanthropists were worse than the
plague and France was governed by ‘plebs’, wrote that one of the reasons why nations
declined was the diffusion of the belief that individual effort is useless and noted bitterly
that French ‘enlightened strata’ had been taken by such fatalism: ‘they are resigned to
social calamities, like people used to be with epidemics, before a science shielded from
pessimism managed to vanquish them’ (Le Bon, 1910, p. 363).
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Even today, many probably believe that Max Weber ultimately indicated the way to
settle these debates once and for all. In his critiques of legal philosophers, historians of
art and Kathedersozialisten, he argued that explanation and evaluation are two radically
distinct logical operations, which typify two different intellectual endeavours: the
empirical and the dogmatic. For example, in the first of his ‘Critical Studies in the Logic
of the Cultural Sciences’, published in 1906, he wrote that ‘Causal analysis provides
absolutely no value judgements; and a value judgement is absolutely not a causal expla-
nation’ (Weber, 1906/2012, p. 145). Historians and sociologists should simply attribute
to certain actions certain effects, and this operation does not involve praise or blame,
justification or indictment, excuse or aggravation. But whether or not one thinks that
Weber provided the most compelling arguments on the matter, it is clear that such
debates have continued uninterrupted throughout the past century.
Post-war debates
Among the most thorough critics of supposed social scientific justifications are several
authors associated with the Frankfurt school. In Reason and Revolution, Herbert
Marcuse contrasted the emancipatory potential of Hegel and Marx’s negative and
dialectical philosophies, which presuppose the reality of human freedom, to the conser-
vative nature of Comte’s positive sociology, according to which necessary laws pat-
terned on the natural sciences govern all human reality. The knowledge of such
invariable social laws leads to a supposedly ‘wise resignation’ to the existing social
order. For Marcuse, then, Comte’s social theory ‘arrives at an ideological defense of
middle-class society and [ . . . ] bears the seeds of a philosophic justification of author-
itarianism’, so that ‘the conceptual interest of the positive sociology is to be apologetic
and justificatory’ (Marcuse, 1955, p. 341, 342).
In the post-World War II United States, various strands of sociological functionalism
have similarly come under attack for justifying the status quo (Gouldner, 1970). This is
well exemplified by criticism against what is known as the Davis and Moore (1945)
thesis, including their claim that ‘[s]ocial inequality is [...] an unconsciously evolved
device by which societies insure that the most important positions are conscientiously
filled by the most qualified persons’ (p. 243). In one response to a critic, Kingsley Davis
(1953, p. 394) wrote that
By insinuating that we are ‘justifying’ such inequality, he falls into the usual error of
regarding a causal explanation of something as a justification of it. He himself offers no
explanation for the universality of stratified inequality. He argues throughout his critique
that stratification does not have to be, instead of trying to understand why it is. Our interest,
however, was only in the latter question.
Another important episode that testifies to the significance of this question is the ‘culture
of poverty’ debate, which became particularly intense in the United States during the
1960s, notably through works by anthropologist Oscar Lewis, political scientist Edward
C. Banfield and government advisor Daniel Patrick Moynihan. These authors believed
that poverty was rooted in certain cultural norms, such as ‘amoral familism’ and
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hypermasculinity. Several of the proponents of the cultural explanation of poverty
claimed that sociological theories of poverty based on structural or political factors (such
as systemic racism) ended up serving as excuses for people’s moral failings and depen-
dency. ‘Liberals,’ Moynihan stated in a 1967 speech, ‘must somehow overcome the
curious condescension that takes the form of defending and explaining away anything,
however outrageous, which Negroes, individually or collectively, might do’ (as cited in
Geary, 2015, p. 185). Opponents of cultural explanations of poverty retorted by arguing
that such purportedly value-free theories were actually taking side in political struggles
by ‘blaming the victim’ (Ryan, 1971) and ended up excusing the real perpetrators, that is,
those who had the power to build a more equal society.
Similar debates took place on the subject of gender and racial pay gaps and other
forms of occupational inequality. Some economists and sociologists explained diver-
gences in professional outcomes as resulting from institutionalised discriminatory prac-
tices or from the absence of equal opportunity, while others explained them as resulting
from individual (often culturally grounded) preferences for certain careers and working
conditions. In this case, however, scholars who emphasised cultural factors were accused
of exonerating the culprits. In her influential Men and Women of the Corporation, for
example, Kanter (1977) wrote that ‘the individual model inevitably leads to the conclu-
sion that “women are different” and serves to reinforce the present structure of organi-
zations and the one-down position of women within them’. Moreover, she added, it
‘leads women to believe that the problem lies in their own psychology, and it gives
organizations a set of excuses for the slow pace of change’. These theoretical disagree-
ments were revealed in all their magnitude in the trial EEOC vs Sears, Roebuck & Co.,
where several scholars, notably historians Rosalind Rosenberg and Kessler Harris, pro-
vided contradictory explanations of occupational inequality in a large retail company
(Milkman, 1986). Meanwhile, strands of neoclassical economics were criticised for
justifying the worst barbarities in the name of market society, especially as the US
imposed this model by persuasion and by force to non-aligned developing countries.
As a critic of the actions of the ‘Chicago Boys’ in Pinochet’s Chile put it, the Chicago
school of economics represents a forceful manifestation of the ‘function of economics as
an apologia for capitalist society and the market system’ (Valdes, 1995, p. 62).
Crime, especially the type most frequently practiced by the urban poor, has remained
the topic most frequently raised in discussions about the exculpatory potential of social
theory. Ayn Rand, an influential writer who celebrated capitalism and egoism in her
novels, inaugurated a new season of right-wing libertarian attacks on social scientists. In
a 1971 article, at a time when crime rates were on the rise in the United States, she
denounced what she called ‘psychologizing’, a ‘subversion of morality’ whereby indi-
viduals are excused or condemned ‘on the grounds of their psychological problems, real
or invented, in the absence of or contrary to factual evidence’. One type of psychologis-
ing, called ‘cynic,’ occurs when professional psychologists ‘rush to the defense of any
murderer [ . . . ], claiming that he could not help it, that the blame rests on society or
environment or his parents or poverty or war, etc’. She lamented that the ideas of
professional scientists are quickly disseminated in society, as ‘these notions are picked
up by amateurs, by psychologising commentators who offer them as excuses for the
atrocities committed by ‘political’ activists, bombers, college-campus thugs, etc’. Rand
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stated that instead of relying on dubious psychological theories in ‘judging’s man’s ideas
and actions’, we should turn to philosophy, which allows us to make objective moral
judgment and requires that we grant ‘a man the respect of assuming that he is conscious
of what he says and does’ (Rand, 1971).
A few years later, Friedrich August von Hayek made a similar argument. He re-
enacted Pareto and Le Bon’s hatred for humanitarianism by recasting it as egalitarian-
ism, a moral view that he deemed ‘destructive’ because by demanding that all members
of a community have the same share of desiderata, including the respect of other mem-
bers, it eliminates ‘the one inducement by which free men can be made to observe any
moral rules: the differentiating esteem by their fellows’. Egalitarianism, according to
Hayek, included the belief that ‘it is nobody’s fault that he is as he is, but that all is the
responsibility of “society”’, and was promoted by ideologues who, ‘assisted by a scien-
tistic psychology’, came to ‘the support of those who claim a share in the wealth of our
society without submitting to the discipline to which it is due’ (Hayek, 1979, pp. 170,
172).
Debates about the exculpatory consequences of social scientific theories of crime
were particularly intense in the United States during the 1980s, at a time when the
country’s criminal justice system became more punitive, following years of unexpected
increases in recorded crime rates and a general hardening of social divisions between
rich and poor (Garland, 2002). Structural and political explanations of crime were
increasingly seen as excuses for wrongdoing by scholars, pundits and politicians. In
1983, US President Ronald Reagan chastised the ‘social philosophy that saw man as
primarily a creature of his material environment’ for provoking ‘much of our crime
problem’. During the 1988 electoral campaign, George H. W. Bush accused his Dem-
ocratic opponent Michael Dukakis and others of wandering ‘far off the clear-cut path of
common sense’ and of having become lost ‘in the thickets of liberal sociology’, since
‘when it comes to crime and criminals, they always seem to blame society first’. The
following year, the then US President stated that to build a safer society, it was first
necessary to agree that ‘society itself doesn’t cause the crime – criminals cause the
crime’. The sophisticated version of these charges could be found in an influential book
by James Q. Wilson and Richard Herrnstein (1985, p. 519), where the authors claim that
‘Much of modern criminology [ . . . ] assigns great importance to motives in judging an
offender, and so is sympathetic to the insanity defense, to excuses based on human need
and social stress, and to applying the doctrine of diminished responsibility to the beha-
vior of juvenile delinquents’.
In the same period, Robert James Bidinotto (1989), a writer heavily influenced by
Ayn Rand, coined the concept of ‘sociological excuse’ and mounted an attack against the
‘excuse-making industry’ (which ‘consists primarily of intellectuals in the social-science
establishment’) in a series of articles published in the Freeman, a magazine of the
libertarian Foundation for Economic Education. For Bidinotto, social scientists, together
with ‘an activist wing of fellow-travelers’ (including ‘social workers, counsellors, thera-
pists, legal-aid, [and] civil liberties lawyers’) ‘initiated a quiet revolution in the 1960s
and 1970s’, which successfully institutionalised their ‘cherished dream: not the punish-
ment, but the rehabilitation of criminals’. The result has been a ‘crime explosion’.
Instead of thinking that ‘poverty causes crime’, he argued that ‘criminality causes
326 European Journal of Social Theory 24(3)
poverty’ and advised that the ‘philosophical doctrine of determinism’, which prevents
people from feeling and being responsible for their actions, be rejected.
But there is also a strand of left-wing libertarianism that has traditionally rejected
sociological explanations as bad excuses. In most cases, however, the explanations that
authors in this tradition dismiss are not of crime or poverty, but of individual and collective
inability to decide on a course of action, especially when it has significant political and
existential consequences. An influential author in this tradition is Jean-Paul Sartre,
(1943/1978), according to whom ‘the peculiar character of human-reality is that it is
without excuse’ (p. 555) and human beings are ‘condemned to be free’ (p. 439), so that
when people see themselves as objects at the mercy of external circumstances or when they
apply to themselves the perspective of ‘psychological determinism’ (p. 40), they are in bad
faith. This existentialist approach inspired several works in the more philosophically
minded quarters of the social sciences, including Roberto Mangabeira Unger’s ‘anti-
necessitarian’ social theory, which aims at refuting the ‘languages of fatalism’ of the two
main theoretical approaches in the social sciences, that of a ‘fossilised and truncated
Marxism’ and that of ‘applied, positive social science’ (Unger, 2001, p. xxii), and purports
to ‘disrupt the implicit, often involuntary alliance between the apologetics of established
order and the explanation of past and present societies’ (Unger, 1987, p. 5).
Moreover, while explanations focusing on structural or political factors have attracted
heavy criticism from conservative sectors, some explanations of crime have provoked
reactions from progressive scholars. This is particularly true of theories drawing on evolu-
tionary psychology and sociobiology to explain practices such as rape and phenomena
such as group-based hierarchies. A good example is Randy Thornhill and Craig Palmer’s
(2000) A Natural History of Rape, which purports to demonstrate that rape has a genetic
origin and is a common feature among animals (including humans) because it increases the
reproductive success of males, at least where it can be done with impunity. Although the
authors claimed that ‘a young man’s evolved sexual desires offer him no excuse whatso-
ever for raping a woman’ (p. 179-180), their book was characterised as ‘the latest
“evolution-made-me-do-it” excuse for criminal behavior’ (Roughgarden, 2004), while
another critic wrote that ‘their stance is insidious because, their protestations to the con-
trary, their account actually amounts to an incitement to rape’ (Martin, 2003, p. 378).
Social dominance theory, a model of intra and intergroup power relations advanced by Jim
Sidanius and Felicia Pratto (2001), was similarly criticised by a philosopher:
Sidanius and Pratto are quick to note that their theory is not intended as an apology for
oppressive behaviour. But there is little doubt that it can and will be taken that way by those
in power. Their theory appears to suggest that dominance of various sorts is inevitable, in
particular, that there will be some arbitrary set dominance and that men will dominate
women. In the minds of many, including policymakers, inevitability is not far from justifia-
bility (Cudd, 2005, p. 45).
Finally, Nazism and the Holocaust are among the subjects that have generated heated
debates about the apologetic effects of social theory and historical knowledge. Three
controversies have been particularly relevant: the first is Hannah Arendt’s (1963/2006)
account of the 1961 trial of Adolf Eichmann in Jerusalem, in which she claimed the
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former Nazi official and major organizer of the Final Solution was not perverted or
sadistic but simply ‘terribly and terrifyingly normal’ (p. 276). Arendt was criticised on
several grounds, but many critics claimed that her account amounted to a ‘defense’ of
Eichmann (see Maier-Katkin & Stoltzfus, 2013). The second is the German Historiker-
streit (1986–1988), during which several historians and social theorists debated the way
Germany should – and should not – interpret its recent past. One of the early interven-
tions was an article by Jürgen Habermas criticising the ‘apologetic tendencies in German
history writing’, represented by Ernst Nolte’s idea that Nazi atrocities not only had been
preceded by Bolshevist ones but were in fact a reaction to them. The third influential
controversy is linked to the publication in 1996 of Daniel Goldhagen’s Hitler’s Willing
Executioners, the main thesis of which is that the Holocaust is the result of widespread
and ‘eliminationist’ anti-Semitic beliefs that were deeply rooted in modern Germany.
The book, a commercial success and a critical failure, lambasted the ‘conceptual inade-
quacies of the conventional explanations’ of the Holocaust, which ‘do not acknowledge,
indeed they deny, the humanity of the perpetrators, namely that they were agents, moral
beings capable of making moral choices’ (Goldhagen, 1996, p. 392). The curious aspect
about the Goldhagen controversy is that many critics claimed that it was his explanation
that actually ended up excusing the Germans. As one of them put it:‘Touted as a searing
indictment of Germans, Goldhagen’s thesis is, in fact, their perfect alibi. Who can
condemn a “crazy” people?’ (Finkelstein, 1998, p. 13).
Towards a theory of social scientific apologia
As can be seen from this historical sketch, social scientists and theorists have been
routinely accused of making apologias, alibis, excuses, justifications, rationalisations
and exonerations of bad things by explaining or interpreting them away. In what follows,
I briefly survey three sets of questions areas that are crucial to understanding these
debates and which I use to introduce the contributions to the special issue. The first
challenge is to establish whether these allegations make sense and what kind of con-
ceptual tools we can use to interpret them. The second challenge is to understand how
these debates can affect how social scientists conduct research, what kind of assumptions
they use and what kind of epistemological countermeasures they devise to counter their
critics. The third challenge is to look at the involvement of social scientists in extra-
academic contexts, from legal courts to social movements, to grasp what role debates
about apologia play there and what consequences they can have on social scientists’
professional standing and authority.
Making sense of the accusation
How, especially in light of Weber’s idea that empirical statements and evaluative state-
ments are logically distinct, could an explanation amount to an apology? In his contri-
bution, Nigel Pleasants (2021) offers some much-needed clarification. While there are
many terms used in debates about apologia, two concepts stand out and have a clear
philosophical meaning: excuse and justification. The widely shared definition in philo-
sophy and social theory is that excuses are accounts that admit that an action is wrong but
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deny that the agent was fully responsible for it (because they acted under coercion,
ignorance or inadvertently), while justifications are accounts that admit the full respon-
sibility of the agent but deny that the action is wrong. Drunkenness is a typical excuse,
self-defence a typical justification.
Pleasants argues that while claims that social scientific explanations can be reduced to
excuses or justifications are often preposterous, it is true that some explanations actually
amount to the justification of certain institutions, while others show that perpetrators
deserve at least some degree of excuse. Discussing historical explanations of Nazi mass
murders committed by rank-and-file policemen, he shows that such explanations do not
automatically excuse perpetrators (let alone justify or forgive them) but can provide
inputs to better assess their moral responsibility. In the end, social scientific knowledge
is one ingredient among others of moral judgment and cannot dictate or bypass it. While
Pleasants’s contribution is grounded in moral philosophy, he considers social psychol-
ogy experiments purporting to show a causal link between reading or writing an expla-
nation of wrongdoing and more lenient judgement. He concludes that such studies are
fascinating but that the evidence supporting them is limited and does not suggest the
existence of a power capable of bypassing ordinary moral judgment. In light of this
uncertainty, the very question of deciding what weight should be given to social scien-
tific explanations in assessing the responsibility of perpetrators is a moral, not a scien-
tific, one.
Pleasants’ philosophical analysis contrasts nicely with works in attribution theory
(Heider, 1958) and in the sociology of accounts (Mills, 1940; Scott & Lyman, 1968),
which provide a different perspective to understand the issue at hand. According to this
heterogeneous body of theories, ordinary people constantly make folk explanations of
their and other people’s actions, notably when these actions solicit strong positive or
negative reactions. These accounts can be complex and culturally variable, but they
generally attribute the actions of an individual (or group) either to the individual them-
selves or to an external factor. In other words, attributions can be either dispositional (if
they refer to features such as the actor’s character, ability or effort) or situational (if they
refer to any sort of external factor). These attributions have profound implications:
people will be seen more positively if their wrong actions are attributed to situational
factors and if their good actions are attributed to dispositional factors. Whether con-
sciously or not, people use attributions strategically to boost their social image and hurt
the social image of their rivals. Punishment and rewards often depend on how actions (or
outcomes) are attributed by influential audiences. This is why attributions are often
contested and why people are prone to what social psychologists call the ‘fundamental
attribution error’, that is, the tendency to attribute their successes to themselves and their
mistakes to external factors. Nonetheless, sociologists have argued that accounts are not
simply self-serving ex post facto rationalisations of action but are instead a ‘crucial
element in the social order’ because they reduce conflict and can be used to manage
expectations (Scott & Lyman, 1968, p. 46). Accounts are also social in the sense that they
are ‘learnt by ordinary cultural transmission, and are drawn from a well-established,
collectively available pool’ (Cohen, 2001, p. 59). It is in this sense that Barnes (2000)
conceives of ordinary explanatory accounts as institutions, notably the institution of
responsible action and that of causal connection.
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What about social scientific justifications, then? The term ‘justification’ is sometime
simply used as a synonym of ‘recommendation’ or ‘approval’. But it seems that often
when someone claims that social scientific theories ‘justify’ certain actions or social
arrangements, they mean something more specific than this, i.e. that the theory presents
certain negative things as normal, as fulfilling some purpose or function or as inevitable.
This, as we saw, is the case of criticism against Durkheim’s interpretation of crime, but
also against all accounts that purport to show the inevitability of what Pleasants (2008)
calls ‘institutional wrongdoing’, that is, arrangements (such as slavery), considered
inevitable by most members of dominant groups whereby harm is imposed on subordi-
nate groups. Sometimes subtle efforts at justification are uncovered even in the choice of
words one uses to describe an occurrence. For example, calling the events at the US
Capitol on 6 January 2021 a “coup” or a “protest” sparks controversy because protests,
unlike coups, are generally seen as a normal and healthy phenomenon in liberal democ-
racies, so that using “protest” entails a positive value judgment.
Since justification does not involve a shift of causal focus, explanations that are
criticised for justifying bad things are often different from explanations that are criticised
for excusing bad things: the former are political rather than scientific, functional rather
than causal. But, as Felson (1991, p. 20) rightly notes, justifications and excuses have
something in common not only in that they are explanations of something perceived as
wrong but also in that they both ‘externalise’ responsibility, albeit in different ways:
excuses state that an agent’s action was forced by external circumstances, while justi-
fications state that an agent responded in an appropriate way to external circumstances.
Looking at things in this way, it is not odd to think that for some people, the knowl-
edge social scientists make and disseminate is part of these never-ending struggles of
attribution. After all, what social scientists do is to explain things, although their expla-
nations generally have a probabilistic nature and deal with general, recurring phenom-
ena: not this particular crime committed by this particular individual but all reported
crimes in a country across several years. Explanations refer to some kind of factor that
accounts for why social groups tend to do certain things rather than others and why they
do certain things more or less than other groups. And many of these factors are so general
(or, as sociologists often say, ‘structural’ or ‘systemic’) that they cannot be easily
reduced to the decision of one or several individuals, so that they are seen as externalis-
ing the responsibility of the agents. Perhaps, then, social scientists are constantly pro-
ducing and disseminating situational attributions, thus menacing the institution of
responsible action. And when the right conditions are met (Ferraro et al., 2005), their
theories can indeed shape attitudes and actions, as shown by a growing body of experi-
mental evidence (e.g. Tilcsik, 2021).
There are at least three caveats to this view, however. The first is that although
accounts internalise or externalise responsibility in some way, they do so to the extent
that they are cast against a different explanatory account, perhaps one that remains
implicit in the background. And there are not just two possible explanatory accounts,
one ‘internal’ and one ‘external’, but many degrees to which an account is perceived as
external or internal. The causal factor, for example, can be more or less proximate to the
agent: what psychologists call ‘external’ or ‘situational’ explanations can refer to distant
causes (such as nineteenth-century colonialism) or to proximate (or mediating) causes
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(such as a policy just enacted by the ruling government). The more distant the causal
factors used in an explanation, the more likely that it will be criticised as a bad excuse
that undermines individual agency. This means that the extent to which an account
externalises (or internalises) responsibility is relative to what other accounts are avail-
able. Cultural explanations of poverty such as those outlined in the so-called Moynihan
report, for example, deploy factors that are ‘external’ relative to purely voluntarist
accounts based on individual goodwill but are ‘internal’ relative to structural explana-
tions of poverty.
The second caveat is that attributions depend on what is being explained: many
progressive social theorists, as shown above, have expressed scepticism and even out-
rage to ‘situational’ explanations of authoritarian, classist, racist and sexist behaviour. In
other words, whether one uses a situational or a dispositional attribution depends on what
kind of behaviour from what kind of group is being explained. Political psychologists
have found that liberals and conservatives display a similar level of intolerance ‘against
social groups whose values and beliefs are inconsistent with their own’ (Brandt et al.,
2014; but see Jost, 2017). They both have their own out-groups, whose negative actions
they will tend to attribute more to dispositions than actions of their in-groups. Conser-
vatives will look for situational attributions to explain mistakes made by members of the
groups they cherish (such as military personnel and Christian fundamentalists) and
progressives will do the same with the groups they support (such as people on welfare
and homosexuals).
The third caveat is that all accounts are not created equal. Becker (1967) pointed to a
‘hierarchy of credibility’, according to which the accounts, explanations and apologies
offered by members of powerful groups are given more credence than those of members of
lower groups. This occurs in small organisations, for example, a hospital or a prison, where
there is an expectation that corrections officers and doctors have better knowledge of what
is going on (and therefore are to be trusted more) than inmates and patients, but also in
society at large, where the same can be said of the upper vis-à-vis the lower classes.
Sociologists, he argued, ‘provoke charges of bias by not giving immediate attention and
‘equal time’ to the apologies and explanations of official authority’ (p. 242). He encour-
aged sociologists to take the side of the subordinates and challenge the hierarchy of
credibility. If he is right, and if his plea has been successful, what are now sometime
dismissed as ‘sociological excuses’ might be simply the reasons of subordinate groups.
The lesson of this is that to properly understand debates about the exculpatory con-
sequences of social scientific knowledge, it is necessary to understand what are the
‘protected groups’ that social scientists either willingly defend from blame or are per-
ceived as defending from blame and what is the ‘hierarchy of credibility’ existing in a
certain society. More generally, we need to understand what moral and political assump-
tions guide social scientists’ research practices and how they differ from assumptions
held by other social groups.
Assumptions, precautions and counterattacks
The social sciences, or even particular disciplines like sociology, are not a monolithic
bloc moulded on a single set of standards and assumptions, but rather a heterogeneous
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complex of different framework which coexist more or less peacefully. Embedded in
these frameworks are ontological, epistemological and ethical assumptions that vary
significantly historically and across countries and disciplines. Whether readers of social
science interpret it as having an apologetic purpose depends a great deal on these
assumptions. Think of the familiar distinction between ‘interpretive’ and ‘causal’ (or
‘naturalist’) approaches to explaining social phenomena (Bevir & Blakely, 2018; Frazer,
2020) or the variable extent to which social scientists use the concepts of decision and
choice (Abend, 2018).
Following this insight, Jana Bacevic’s (2021) contribution to the special issue anal-
yses the assumptions guiding different contemporary approaches to the study of society.
By contrasting Arendt’s Eichmann in Jerusalem to Adorno and Horkheimer’s The Dia-
lectic of the Enlightenment, she argues that the former is an interpretation of the Holo-
caust that emphasises individual action and agency (or lack thereof), while the latter
highlights social factors, that is, the process of rationalisation inherent in the Enlight-
enment. This contrast exemplifies a deep-rooted opposition within social theory, one
with profound consequences: while explanations that refer to social factors (such as
Adorno and Horkheimer’s) are particularly exposed to attacks dismissing them as bad
‘sociological excuses’, they and they only are the theoretical force that can ground a real
critique and transformation of the existing political order and this is especially true in
societies dominated by a neoliberal ideology, according to which individuals are the sole
bearers of responsibility. Governments and political leaders, instead, rely on a submis-
sive behavioural science aimed at the prediction and control of populations, whose
members are seen as irrational actors that need to be ‘nudged’ into adopting appropriate
behaviours.
In his contribution to the special issue, Stephen Turner (2020) examines the often-
tacit assumptions about agency, blame and responsibility that guided US sociologists in
their explanations of why Black people commit a disproportionate amount of violent
crime. Turner’s focus is not on criticisms alleging that sociological explanation unduly
excuses criminals. Instead, he observes that many progressive sociologists saw exculpa-
tion as a positive implication of their explanations, as Black people suffered severe
discrimination from the White majority. However, exculpation has a negative side effect:
making the excused look as if they are not fully responsible and accountable members of
the moral community, thus diminishing their status as moral agents. Turner shows that
US sociologists devised various, more or less successful, precautions to prevent their
explanations from undermining the moral autonomy of Black people. He thus gives an
additional twist to the dynamic of debates about social scientific apologia: criticism
might come not only from people hostile to a certain ‘protected’ group, who think that
explanations of the group’s actions amount to bad excuses, but also from people who are
sympathetic to the group and who believe that the explanations, while potentially exon-
erating its members from blame, do more harm than good in the long run.
My own contribution (Brandmayr, 2021) focuses on more conventional criticism of
social scientific apologia. It looks at debates that followed terrorist attacks in France
during the 2010s, when researchers where repeatedly accused of making up ‘sociological
excuses’ for terrorists. They counter-attacked by adopting three different (and logically
incompatible) argumentative strategies, which reveal deep tensions within the French
332 European Journal of Social Theory 24(3)
sociological field: some denied the allegations, others reappropriated the derogatory
label of excuse, while others still sided with the critics and called for a reformation of
sociology. To a certain extent, the debates I analyse in my contribution took place in
newspapers, magazines, TV shows and online media. In these extra-academic contexts,
social scientists are often confronted with people who do not share their assumptions and
who might dismiss their work for political reasons. This poses great challenges for those
researchers who wish to act as expert advisors and scientific populariser, as I show in the
next section.
Beyond the moats of the ivory tower
Accounts work if they are socially accepted. Social acceptance, however, is an unstable
category: it can change in the same way as culture changes because of such factors as
political shifts, novel ideologies and technological developments. Accounts might be
accepted by some people but not by others, and different institutions might dissent
about the validity of a given account. Competing professional groups might try to
establish a monopoly over their assessment. How do social scientists attempt to inte-
grate their theoretical and explanatory frameworks in the workings of extra-academic
institutions and organisations, and in what cases are their inputs criticised for their
exculpatory or justificatory consequences? In a way, debates about social scientific
apologia are always about how academic knowledge shapes the world outside acade-
mia by providing wrongdoers with “techniques of neutralization” (Sykes & Matza,
1957). But controversies intensify when social scientists are actively involved in
worldly affairs. And this is not uncommon: social scientists play a role in various
extra-academic contexts, including advisory committees, political parties, courts of
law, corporate boardrooms and in channels such as newspapers, TV shows, radio
programmes and social networks (Camic et al., 2012; Jenkins & Kroll-Smith, 1996).
In some of these settings, the point of their involvement is to provide information that
removes or diminishes the responsibility of an incriminated person: in the United
States, for example, psychologists and sociologists are regularly summoned as expert
witnesses in criminal cases as part of a ‘victimization’ defence strategy (Nolan &
Westervelt, 2000).
These contexts are often characterised by adversarial rules, polarisation and sensa-
tionalism, where nuances are lost and the appeal to emotions widespread. This influences
what kind of explanations social scientists make and how they present them, so that their
knowledge can have, or be perceived as having, performative effects of the exculpatory
and justificatory sorts. Most researchers, for example, would normally not say that a
person or group ‘could not have done otherwise’ when explaining their actions and
would use more cautious wording instead. In extra-academic contexts, however, either
they are urged to make more peremptory statements or their nuanced statements are
transformed intro caricatures by their opponents or by the audience.
Hadrien Malier’s (2021) contribution to the special issue addresses the problem of
how explanatory accounts travel via various media channels from academia to political
organisations and social movements. It looks at how his own sociological reflections on
the middle-class overrepresentation in French environmental movements were reported
Brandmayr 333
in the press and on social media and how they were interpreted by some readers as handy
excuses working-class people could use for not adopting eco-friendly lifestyles. But
Malier found more than simple hostility against sociological knowledge: in his ethno-
graphic study of green activism in poor neighbourhoods, he found that activists regularly
integrate insights from social scientific theories to make sense of why things are as they
are. However, by focusing on certain consumption practices, these folk explanations
often cast the precarious layers of the working class in an unfavourable light and ratio-
nalise instead the need for enlightened (middle-class) activists in the education of the
poor. These folk sociological explanations do not carry the risk of unduly excusing but
rather of unduly demeaning and debasing.
Social scientists face a paradoxical situation: to the extent that they want to have an
impact, advise policymakers and appeal to a wide public, they will almost inevitably
have to add a normative dimension to their theories and make attributions of responsi-
bility, assign credit and cast blame, thus triggering reactions against what some will
interpret as defamation or apologia. They will be accused of being sectarian ideologues
and of having betrayed their scientific duty. Still, many would prefer this to a knowledge
that has no bearing on how blame and credit are assigned and that is condemned to
irrelevance. Perhaps we should accept the political character of ‘interesting’ social
theory, in Murray S. Davis’s (1971) sense, and be explicit about the attributions of
responsibility that derive from our theories, rather than hiding behind a precarious mask
of scientific objectivity.
Many issues emerge when it comes to social scientific apologia, and it is impossible
to address them all here. However, the special issue wants to be a step forward in the
recognition and understanding of this complex subject.
Acknowledgement
Many thanks to Anna Alexandrova, Matteo Bortolini, Riccardo Emilio Chesta and Nigel Pleasants
for thoughtful comments on earlier drafts of this paper.
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship,
and/or publication of this article.
Funding





Abend, G. (2018). The limits of decision and choice. Theory and Society, 47(6), 805–841.
Arendt, H. (2006). Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on The Banality of Evil. Penguin Books.
(Original work published 1963).
334 European Journal of Social Theory 24(3)
Bacevic, J. (2021). No such thing as sociological excuses? Performativity and social-scientific
expertise in late liberalism. European Journal of Social Theory.
Barnes, B. (2000). Understanding Agency: Social Theory and Responsible Action. Sage.
Becker, H. S. (1967). Whose Side Are We On? Social Problems, 14(3), 239–247.
Bevir, M., & Blakely, J. (2018). Interpretive Social science: An Anti-Naturalist Approach. Oxford
University Press.
Bidinotto, R. J. (1989). Crime and Consequences, Part 1: Criminal Responsibility. The Freeman,
July 1989.
Brandmayr, F. (2021). Explanations and excuses in French sociology. European Journal of Social
Theory.
Brandt, M. J., Reyna, C., Chambers, J. R., Crawford, J. T., & Wetherell, G. (2014). The
Ideological-Conflict Hypothesis: Intolerance Among Both Liberals and Conservatives. Current
Directions in Psychological Science, 23(1), 27–34.
Brewer, J., & Wollman, H. (2011). Sociologists’ offer to unravel the riots. The Guardian, 11
August 2011.
Camic, C., Gross, N., & Lamont, M. (Eds.). (2012). Social Knowledge in the Making. University of
Chicago Press.
Cohen, S. (2001). States of Denial: Knowing about Atrocities and Suffering. Polity.
Cudd, A. E. (2005). How to Explain Oppression: Criteria of Adequacy for Normative Explanatory
Theories. Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 35(1), 20–49.
Davis, K. (1953). Reply to Tumin. American Sociological Review, 18(4), 394–397.
Davis, K., & Moore, W. E. (1945). Some Principles of Stratification. American Sociological
Review, 10(2), 242–249.
Davis, M. S. (1971). That’s Interesting! Towards a Phenomenology of Sociology and a Sociology
of Phenomenology. Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 1(2), 309–344.
Engels, F. (1892). The Condition of the Working Class in England in 1844. Swan Sonnenschein.
(Original work published 1845).
Felson, R. B. (1991). Blame Analysis: Accounting for the Behavior of Protected Groups. The
American Sociologist, 22(1), 5–23.
Ferraro, F., Pfeffer, J., & Sutton, R. I. (2005). Economics Language and Assumptions: How
Theories Can Become Self-Fulfilling. Academy of Management Review, 30(1), 8–24.
Finkelstein, N. G. (1998). Daniel Jonah Goldhagen’s ‘Crazy’ Thesis: A Critique of Hitler’s
Willing Executioners. In N. G. Finkelstein & R. B. Birn (Eds.), A Nation on Trial: The Gold-
hagen Thesis and Historical Truth. Macmillan.
Frazer, M. (2020). Respect for Subjects in the Ethics of Causal and Interpretive Social Explana-
tion. American Political Science Review, 144(4), 1001–1012.
Garland, D. (2002). The Culture of Control: Crime and Social Order in Contemporary Society.
Oxford University Press.
Geary, D. (2015). Beyond Civil Rights: The Moynihan Report and Its Legacy. University of
Pennsylvania Press.
Goldhagen, D. J. (1996). Hitler’s Willing Executioners: Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust.
Alfred A. Knopf.
Gouldner, A. W. (1970). The Coming Crisis of Western Sociology. Basic Books.
Hacking, I. (1990). The Taming of Chance. Cambridge University Press.
Brandmayr 335
Hayek, F. A. (1979). Law, Legislation and Liberty, Volume 3: The Political Order of a Free
People. University of Chicago Press.
Heider, F. (1958). The Psychology of Interpersonal Relations. John Wiley.
Jackson, N. D. (2007). Hobbes, Bramhall and the Politics of Liberty and Necessity: A Quarrel of
the Civil Wars and Interregnum. Cambridge University Press.
Jenkins, P., & Kroll-Smith, J. S. (Eds.). (1996). Witnessing for Sociology: Sociologists in Court.
Greenwood Publishing Group.
Jost, J. T. (2017). Ideological Asymmetries and the Essence of Political Psychology. Political
Psychology, 38(2), 167–208.
Kanter, R. M. (1977). Men and Women of the Corporation. Basic Books.
Le Bon, G. (1910). Psychologie politique et la défense sociale [Political psychology and social
defense]. Flammarion.
Lebaron, F., Jedlicki, F., & Willemez, L. (2015). La sociologie, ce n’est pas la culture de l’excuse!
[Sociology is no culture of excuse!]. Le Monde, 14 December 2015.
Lombroso, C. (2006). Criminal Man. Duke University Press. (Original work published 1884).
Lottin, J. (1912). Quetelet: Statisticien et sociologue [Quetelet: Statistician and sociologist]. Félix
Alcan.
Maier-Katkin, D., & Stoltzfus, N. (2013). Hannah Arendt on Trial. The American Scholar, June 10,
2013.
Malier, H. (2021). No (sociological) excuses for not going green: How do environmental activists
make sense of social inequalities and relate to the working-class? European Journal of Social
Theory.
Marcuse, H. (1955). Reason and Revolution (2nd ed.). Routledge & Kegan Paul.
Martin, E. (2003). What Is “Rape?”—Toward a Historical, Ethnographic Approach. In C. B.
Travis (Ed.), Evolution, Gender, and Rape. MIT Press.
Marx, K. (1934). The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte. Progress Publishers. (Original
work published 1869).
Marx, K. (1968). Theories of Surplus Value. Volume IV of capital. Part II. Progress Publishers.
(Original work published 1905).
Milkman, R. (1986). Women’s History and the Sears Case. Feminist Studies, 12(2), 375–400.
Millican, P. (2009). Hume, Causal Realism, and Causal Science. Mind, 118(471), 647–712.
Mills, C. W. (1940). Situated Actions and Vocabularies of Motive. American Sociological Review,
5(6), 904–913.
Nadler, S. (2018). Spinoza: A Life (2nd ed). Cambridge University Press.
Nolan, J. L. J., & Westervelt, S. D. (2000). Justifying Justice: Therapeutic Law and the Victimiza-
tion Defense Strategy. Sociological Forum, 15, 617–646.
Pareto, V. (1935). The Mind and Society, Volume 3: Theory of Derivations. Jonathan Cape.
(Original work published 1916).
Pleasants, N. (2008). Institutional Wrongdoing and Moral Perception. Journal of Social Philoso-
phy, 39(1), 96–115.
Pleasants, N. (2021). Excuse and justification: What’s explanation and understanding got to do
with it? European Journal of Social Theory.
Rand, A. (1971). The Psychology of Psychologizing. The Objectivist, March 1971.
Roughgarden, J. (2004). Evolution, Gender, and Rape: A Bradford book. Ethology, 110(1), 76.
Ryan, W. (1971). Blaming the Victim. Pantheon Books.
336 European Journal of Social Theory 24(3)
Sartre, J.-P. (1978). Being and Nothingness: A Phenomenological Essay on Ontology. Pocket
Books. (Original work published 1943).
Scott, M. B., & Lyman, S. M. (1968). Accounts. American Sociological Review, 33(1), 46–62.
Sidanius, J., & Pratto, F. (2001). Social Dominance: An Intergroup Theory of Social Hierarchy and
Oppression. Cambridge University Press.
Sumner, W. G. (1906). Folkways: A Study of the Sociological Importance of Usages, Manners,
Customs, Mores, and Morals. Ginn.
Sykes, G. M., & Matza, D. (1957). Techniques of Neutralization: A Theory of Delinquency.
American Sociological Review, 22(6), 664–670.
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